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SECURITIES REGULATION-RULE 10b-5-IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF
ACTION-STANDING-PURCHASER OR SELLER REQUIREMENT--Blue

Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
On June 9, 1975, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,' the
United States Supreme Court carved out a new niche for itself in the
annals of judicial conservatism, by "grav[ing] into stone Birnbaum's
arbitrary principle of standing." 2 Since the promulgation of rule IOb-58
in 1942, and especially since the decision in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp.,4 in 1952, both federal courts and legal writers have produced

voluminous dissertations on the scope and effect of this rule,5 which
requires a plaintiff in a rule IOb-5 suit to be either a purchaser or seller
of 'the securities involved.'

Generally the courts have favored the strict

1. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
2. Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
3. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person ....
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which there were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
4. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
5. See, e.g., comments cited in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
768-69 n.3 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6. Birnbaum involved a shareholders' derivative suit which essentially attacked a
breach of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders. The primary defendant, Feldmann, was
both president and controlling shareholder of Newport Steel Corporation. He abused
this power by refusing to consummate a merger which would have been highly profitable
to all the shareholders. Instead, he sold his own shares to another defendant, Wilport
Company, at twice the then market value of the stock. This resulted in substantial
detriment to the remaining shareholders. These shareholders filed a suit alleging
violation of rule 10b-5 in that Feldmann had perpetrated a fraud in the sale of his stock.
193 F.2d at 462. The court, in denying plaintiffs' standing, held that
the Rule in question [is] aimed only at "a fraud perpetrated upon the purchaser
or seller" of securities and [has] no relation to breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate insiders resulting in fraud upon those who were not purchasers or sellers.
Id. at 463.
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limitation of Birnbaum,7 while legal writers have strongly opposed
them." In recent years, however, a growing trend away from a uniformly strict interpretation began to evidence itself, as courts found ways to
allow deserving plaintiffs to maintain their causes of action.9
The Supreme Court had carefully avoided the standing issue until its
ruling in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,10
which undermined the substantive ruling of the Birnbaum court by
allowing the plaintiffs to maintain a rule 10b-5 action based on corporate mismanagement tangentially related to the sale of securities. 1 The
procedutal aspects of Birnbaum were left intact, however, although
many commentators,' 2 reading the language of Bankers Life together
with Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,'3 believed the complete
7. But cf. Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). In that case the Seventh Circuit flatly rejected
Birnbaum's purchaser-seller standing requirement. Other courts, while paying verbal
homage to the rule, have in fact stretched and molded the standing requirement to fit the
particular case. See James v. Gerber Prods. Co., 483 F.2d 944 (6th Cir. 1973) (trust
beneficiaries); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967) (parties to
incomplete transaction); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (minority shareholders in short form mergers); Hooper v.
Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814
(1961) (issuers).
8. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule
10b-5, 54 VA. L. Ray. 268 (1968); cf. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial
Revision of LegislativeIntent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627 (1963).
9. See cases cited in note 7 supra.
10. 404 U.S. 6 (1971). This case involved a complicated scheme which resulted in
Manhattan Casualty Co. essentially being stripped of its assets. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., the sole owner of Manhattan's stock, agreed to sell it all to Mr. Begole. Begole
then proceeded, through a series of fraudulent transactions, to pay for the stock with
Manhattan's own assets, consisting primarily of $4.8 million worth of United States
Treasury bonds. The liquidator of Manhattan then brought an action under section
10(b) on behalf of the company's creditors. The Supreme Court held that the sale of
the Treasury bonds involved fraud and thus qualified under section 10(b) and rule lob-5.
In so doing, the Court gave a broad interpretation to section 10(b). The Court also
used language peculiarly applicable to the present case:
Since practices "constantly vary and where practices legitimate for some purposes
may be turned to illegitimate and fraudulent means, broad discretionary powers" in
the regulatory agency "have been found practically essential." [H.R. Rep. No.
1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 7] Hence we do not read § 10(b) as narrowly as the
Court of Appeals; it is not "limited to preserving the integrity of the securities markets" though that purpose is included. Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not
technically and restrictively. Since there was a "sale" of a security and since fraud
was used "in connection with" it, there is redress under § 10(b), whatever might
be available as a remedy under state law.
404 U.S. at 12 (citation omitted).
11. ld. at 9-13.
12. See sources cited in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 768-69
n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
13. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute the Court held that in a case
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demise of Birnbaum to be imminent. Certainly the courts did not feel
constrained to follow Birnbaum to the letter as evidenced by the Seventh

Circuit's explicit rejection of the limitation in Eason v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp.,14 and the Ninth Circuits enunciation of a major
exception to it in 1973,1- only one year after adopting Birnbaum as -the
rule to be applied in rule lOb-5 litigation."0 In Blue Chip the Supreme

Court reversed the position it had implicitly taken in Bankers Life, thus
undermining the precedent authority of those cases rejecting Birnbaum.
The Blue Chip case traces its origins back to 1963 when the United

States filed a complaint charging Blue Chip Stamp Company, Thrifty
Drug Stores, and eight grocery chains with conspiracy to restrain trade

and with monopolization of the trading stamp business in California.
The case was settled by a consent decree in 1967.' r Other retailers,
including Manor Drugs, which used Blue Chip stamps but owned no

part of the company, appeared as amicus curiae during the proceedings
and argued that the Blue Chip Stamp Company was originally intended

to be a non-profit venture on behalf of all users of Blue Chip stamps and
involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them important in
the making of this decision.
Id. at 153-54 (emphasis added). The Court also cited language from Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), and SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963), which indicated that the securities legislation was to be construed liberally and with the idea of enforcing a philosophy of full
disclosure in the securities industry. 406 U.S. at 151.
Affiliated Ute was a suit brought by mixed-blood Indians under section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 against the United States, First Security Bank of Utah (which acted as
transfer agent for the Indians' stock), and two bank employees. The Court found that
the bank and its employees had engaged in a systematic scheme to defraud the Indians
into selling their stock at prices below the fair market value. These defendants had
encouraged and created a market for this stock in the White community, had received
personal gratuities and commissions from the buyers, and had failed to disclose the actual market value of the stock to the sellers.
14. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
15. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421
U.S. 723 (1975). The circuit court in Blue Chip briefly discussed the impracticality of
proving damages in lOb-5 actions involving non-purchasers, and concluded that the
Birnbaum standing requirement was usually a valid method of eliminating these "unprovable" suits at the outset. However, the court found that in the present situation the
existence of a consent decree made it possible to objectively determine the amount of
damages, and thus applying Birnbaum would only serve to "subordinate substance to
form." Id. at 142.
16. Mount Clemens Indus., Inc. v. Bell, 464 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1972).
17. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd
sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
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that they in fact owned an equitable interest in the company and in
$20,000,000 it had accumulated as profits. 8
In response to these arguments, part of -the consent decree provided
for a reorganization of Blue Chip through which the defending stockholders were to be divested of fifty-five per cent of their interest, totalling 621,000 shares of common stock. This was to be accomplished by
selling "units" of securities, consisting of one debenture and three shares
of common stock. The units were to be offered to retail users of Blue
Chip Stamps who had not previously held stock in the company in
proportion to their use of stamps during a designated period. The
selling price to these retailers was $101.00, but the fair market value
of each unit was $315.00. Any of the units which were not purchased
could later be sold on the open market by the issuer. 9
It was alleged that the existing shareholders of the company attempted to discourage the new offerees from accepting this bargain offer by
publishing a prospectus which minimized the value of the offering and
painted a bleak picture of the financial future of the company.2 0
Another prospectus, issued a year later when the units were offered to
the public at a higher price, made no reference to these negative
factors. 2 ' Because the plaintiff was dissuaded from purchasing the
stock as a result of the earlier misrepresentations, it brought suit seeking
damages for the lost opportunity io purchase, the right to purchase at
22
the previous price, and exemplary damages.
The case reached the Supreme Court on the question of whether
Manor Drugs could bring an action for violation of rule 10b-5 "without
having either bought or sold the securities described in the allegedly
misleading prospectus. '2 3 The district court held that it could not and
18. For a complete summary of the history and facts of the case see Manor Drug
Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 138-40 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723
(1975); Comment, Chipping Away at the Birnbaum Doctrine: Manor Drug Stores v.
Blue Chip Stamps, 8 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 171, 179-80 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Chipping Away].

19. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35, 37 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
rev'd, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
20. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 763-64 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). Specifically the prospectus stated that claims pending against the company
aggregated approximately $29,000,000. These claims were later settled for less than
$1,000,000. In addition, the redemption rate was estimated at 97 1/2 percent, when
historically less than 90 percent were redeemed. This resulted in an understatement of
earnings of about 80 percent.
21. id.
22. Id. at 727.
23. Id.
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dismissed the complaint'accordingly. 24 The plaintiff, on appeal, argued
only the rule 10b-5 claim."

The Ninth Circuit recognized the unique

nature of -the factual situation and granted the plaintiff standing, thus
creating a narrow exception to the Birnbaum rule."
denied rehearing en banc and certiorari was granted. 7

Subsequently it

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, examined

both the legislative intent and the current policy considerations relevant
to rule 10b-5 cases. He concluded that although the advantages of the
Birnbaum rule "are more difficult to articulate ' 28 than the disadvantages, the danger of vexatious litigation and the undesirability of a caseby-case erosion of the rule required the Court to uphold the strict

interpretation of the purchaser-seller requirement.20
The concurring opinion, 0 written by Justice Powell, with whom
Justices Stewart and Marshall joined, agreed with the majority, but
placed greater reliance on the text of the Securities Act of 1933 (the

1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),
particularly the language of section 10b and rule 10b-5. 11 These Justices also chose to dwell on the subjective problems of proof and class

limitation. They found that the "unpredictable consequences for the
process of raising capital so necessary to our economic well-being" that
might accompany the demise of the Birnbaum rule outweighed any

arguments for a flexible interpretation of the purchaser-seller limitation.

32

Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissent24. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 339 F. Supp. 35 (C.D. Cal. 1971), rev'd,
492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
25. In the district court plaintiffs had also alleged violations of section 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771 .(1970). In addition they claimed status as third
party beneficiaries under the consent decree. The district court dismissed the first of
these contentions, noting that section 12 "expressly limits recovery to . . . 'purchasers'
.... " 339 F. Supp. at 38-39. With regard to the consent decree, the court stated that
it was well established that
[t]he fact that the decree was intended to benefit certain non-parties does not con,fer on them an independent cause of action for violation of the decree.
Id. at 38.
26. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421
U.S. 723 (1975).
27. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 419 U.S. 922 (1974).
28. 421 U.S. at 739.
29. Id. at 755.
30. Id. (Powell, I., concurring).
31. E.g., id. at 760.
32. Id.
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ed.33 They found the legislative history relied on by the other members
of the Court to be inconclusive. The dissent attacked the facile acceptance of lower court precedence on a subject never before examined by
the Court. Finally, the dissent deplored the majority's reliance on
pragmatism and conjecture in reaching a conclusion which exhibited a
"preternatural solicitousness for corporate well-being and a seeming
callousness toward the investing public quite out of keeping. . with
34
our own traditions and the intent of the securities laws."
The arguments in this case epitomize the ongoing conflicts that have
plagued the lower courts for twenty-three years in their attempts to delineate the proper scope of the class of plaintiffs that may bring a 10b-5
action. The opinions in Blue Chip highlight the two main areas of the
problem: (1) the ambiguity of the legislative intent and (2) the validity of using policy considerations to expand or restrict the class of potential plaintiffs.
I.

LEGISLATIVB HISTORY

Ironically, section 10(b) was. one of the least controversial parts of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
[With] nearly a thousand pages of hearings in the House, the combined
would scarcely fill a page. Much
references to § 10(b) (then § 9(c))
35
Senate.
the
in
true
[was]
same
the
Yet with this dearth of legislative history which -the Court admitted is
inconclusive,3 6 the majority set forth congressional intent as the major
substantive justification for its opinion. As a result of the inconclusive
nature of this legislative history, the Justices in Blue Chip appear to
indulge in what may aptly be called a "quoting contest' to justify their
differing opinions.
The majority opened with a discussion of the development of private
suits under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and rule 10b-5.1 7 The Court noted
that the history of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 nowhere indicates that
neither Congress nor the SEC ever considered the question of private
33. Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 762.
35. 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuTrrIEs LAW: FRAsu SEC RULE 10b-5 § 2.2 (330) (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG]. Section 10(b) was originally introduced as section
9(c). S. 2693 and H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(c) (1934); see 78 CoNG. REC.
2267 (1934).
36. 421 U.S. at 733, 737.
37. Id. at 728-30.
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civil remedies under these provisions.3 Yet, the Court commented that
beginning with Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 9 in 1946, the lower
courts had allowed private implied actions and consistently ignored the

glaring contrast between the carefully drawn civil remedies of the 1933
and 1934 Acts and the catch-all nature of section 10(b).40 This course
of action was finally affirmed in Bankers Life, 4' and was an extension
of the Court's decision in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak4 2 that private enforce-

ment of SEC rules "provides a necessary supplement to Commission
action.""
Having determined that the right of a private action under section
10(b) and rule IOb-5 had been firmly extended by judicial decision, the
Court -then turned to other provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts for
guidance in determining -the contours of this right. However, the
majority opinion is not consistent in its analysis. On one hand the
Court states that the implied private right of -action must be limited to
actual purchasers and sellers in view of the fact that there was "no
congressional intention to extend a private civil remedy for money
damages to other than defrauded purchasers or sellers.' ' 4 Yet, in
an earlier passage, the Court indicated that private suits were never contemplated by Congress.45 Viewed in this light, the Court's professed
concern for congressional intent seems somewhat hollow. 40 Further38. Id. at 729. What legislative history there is seems to indicate that Congress
intended this section to be a tool of the Commission to prevent enterprising individuals
from profiting by means of statutory loopholes. For a noteworthy discussion opposing
private liability see Ruder, Civil Liability under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. U.L. RaV. 627, 642-60 (1963). But see Joseph, Civil
Liability Under Rule lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964).
39. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
40. 421 U.S. at 730.
41. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
42. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
43. Id. at 432.
44. 421 U.S. at 731 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 729.
46. There is, of course, ample judicial precedent, beginning with Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), to make the private cause of action a
tacit assumption. However, the majority's equivocal language on this point creates the
impression that it might not turn away from the opportunity to eliminate private
enforcement of the Securities Acts entirely. In the present context, the Court focused on
section 29(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78ce (1970). Section 29(b) states that a
contract made in violation of any provision of the 1934 Act is voidable at the option of
the deceived party. This section has provided one of the justifications for an implied
cause of action under section 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). Finding that there was
no contract and no actual purchase or sale, the Court used this to help justify denying
plaintiff's standing. See 421 U.S. at 735. The Court's reasoning is unpersuasive as it
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more, the interpretation of the securities laws in Blue Chip represents a

complete departure from the Court's previous inclination to broadly
construe securities laws in order to protect investors and to provide

remedies.47
The Court attempted to glean congressional intent not so much from
what Congress did in enacting seotion 10(b), but rather from the

implications arising from congressional inaction.4 8

First, the Court

noted that Congress had not amended section 10(b) after Birnbaum although it had the opportunity to do so. Second, the Court compared the
language of the section to the language used in other sections and
concluded that the congressional scheme thus evidenced "support[ed]
the result reached by the Birnbaum court."49

In this regard it is interesting to note that the majority cited section
17(a), 0 the parallel anti-fraud provision of the 1933 Act, to support its

conclusion that Congress intended to limit the class of plaintiffs in
10(b) suits to actual purchasers and sellers. Section 17(a) reaches
fraud in the offer as well as in the sale of securities. This use of the
word "offer" in section 17(a), when contrasted with the use of "purcompletely ignores another basis of recovery recognized by Kardon, the statutory tort.
See 69 F. Supp. at 514; notes 51-52 infra.
47. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966); J.L Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432, 433 (1964) ("While [the language of section 14(a) of the
1934 Act] makes no specific reference to a private right of action, among its chief purposes is the protection of investors, which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result. . . . mhe duty of the courts [is] to be
alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose."); SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 197-99 (1963);
SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 430 U.S. 344 (1944). In Joiner the Court stated:
[C]ourts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context and will interpret the text so far
as the meaning of the words fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases
the generally expressed legislative policy.
Id. at 350-51 (footnote omitted).
48. 421 U.S. at 733.
49. Id.
50. Id. Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
(emphasis added.)
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chase" in section 10(b), does create a strong inference supporting the
majority's thesis. However, the opinion failed to discuss the equally viable fact that the 1933 and 1934 Acts should be read together as one

comprehensive federal scheme to prevent securities frauds. In this context it would appear that Congress may have intended to prevent fraud

in securities offerings as well as in actual purchases or sales. Some consideration should be given to this overall scheme when a judicially created rule of standing is arbitrarily used to eliminate recovery of dam-

ages in cases of fraudulent offerings. The Court, however, made no
attempt to analyze these implications.

A significant deficiency of the majority opinion lies in its failure to
recognize the alternative rationale of the implied right of action under

rule l0b-5, the statutory tort. This common law doctrine allows a person
injured through a violation of a statute enacted for the benefit of a class
of which the injured person is a member to recover damagei.51 This
51
doctrine was relied on in Kardon.
The Blue Chip Court, however,

ignored this basis for liability and in the portion of the opinion in which
it discussed standing it did so in terms of a contractual relationship. 8
Whatever the reason for this, there seems to be an underlying implica-

tion in the majority opinion that since the private right to enforce federal
statutes and SEC rules is court-created, the Court upon reconsideration may revoke it.
In contrast to the majority opinion, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
dissent, found it manifest that the plaintiff had alleged the use of a
deceptive scheme "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
51. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF ToRTs § 17.6 (1956); W. PROSSER,
ThE LAW OF TORTS 190-204 (4th ed. 1971).
52. There the court stated:
This rule is more than merely a canon of statutory interpretation. The disregard
of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort....
"This is but an
application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium."
Of course, the legislature may withhold from parties injured the right to recover
damages arising by reason of violation of a statute but the right is so fundamental
and so deeply ingrained in the law that where it is not expressly denied the intention
to withhold it should appear very clearly and plainly.
69 F. Supp. at 513-14 (citation omitted).
53. 421 U.S. at 751. This contractual theory arose from section 29(b) of the 1934
Act which provides that a contract made in violation of any of the provisions of the Act
is void. 15 U.S.C. § 78ce (1970). It was also discussed in Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 514:
It seems to me -that a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall
be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect of it. The statute would
be of little value unless a party to the contract could apply to the Courts to relieve
himself of obligations under it or to escape its consequences.
69 F. Supp. at 514; see note 46 supra. This theory is not as frequently used as that of
the statutory tort. See BROMBERG, supranote 28, § 2.4(1) (a)-(b).
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security." 54 Placing an emphasis on the facts of the case before the
Court, which the majority all but ignored, the dissent found an anomaly
in the denial of relief based on the fact that the plaintiff did not "fit into
the mechanistic categories of either 'purchaser' or 'seller' when the
very purpose of the alleged scheme was,to inhibit the plaintiffs from ever
acquiring the status of 'purchaser.' "55
The dissent quoted extensively from the Congressional Record and
other legislative sources which emphasized the broad purpose and
scope which the 1934 Act was intended to have in the area of fraud.
The dissent relied on the statement made by Thomas G. Corcoran, one
of the drafters of the Bill, in his explanation of the section to the House
Committee:
[This section] says: 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning devices.'
. . . Of course fit] is a catch-all clause to prevent, manipulative devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause.
The Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices. 56
Then, noting the casual origins of rule 10b-5 and reasoning that "[to]
say specifically that certain types of fraud are~within Rule lOb-5, of
course, is not to say that others are necessarily excluded," the dissent
concluded the essential test should be the "showing of a logical nexus
between the alleged fraud and the sale. or purohase of a security." 57
In addition to attacking the Court's interpretation of legislative intent,
Blackmun criticized the majority's unquestioning reliance on the "longstanding acceptance by the courts" and on "Congress' failure to reject
Birnbaum's reasonable interpretation of the wording of section
10(b)."15 8 His strongest criticism, however, was aimed at the Court's
discussion of "vexatiousness" and its reliance on policy considerations. 9

U1.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

That the Blue Chip majority was in fact relying on policy considerations in reaching its decision is clear. After analysis of the available
54. 421 U.S. at 764.

55. Id. at 765.
56. Hearingson H.R. 7852 & H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934).
57. 421 U.S. at 770.
58. Id. at 769.

$9, Id. at 769-70,
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legislative intent, the Court undermined its previous arguments regarding congressional creation of the purchaser-seller requirement by stating:
[Wie would by no means be understood as suggesting that we are able
to divine from the language of § 10(b) the express "intent of Congress"
as to the contours of a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5 . 0
As the Court was unconvinced by its own discussion of legislative
intent, it decided to base its opinion purely upon "policy" considerations. Noting that a majority of commentators have found the Birnbaum limitation to be an "arbitrary restriction which unreasonably prevents some deserving plaintiffs from recovering damages which have
in fact been caused by violations of Rule lOb-5,"' the Court went on
to state:
We have no doubt that this is indeed a disadvantage of the Birnbaum
rule, and if it had no countervailing advantages it would be undesirable
as a matter of policy, however much it might be supported by precedent
and legislative history. But we are of the opinion that there are countervailing advantages to the Birnbaumrule, purely as a matter of policy,
although those advantages are more difficult to articulate than is the disadvantage. 62
The Court then launched into a discussion of the vexatious nature of
lOb-5 litigation. This concern of the Court for the mundane realities
of the American judicial system appears 83 to be based on two grounds:
(1) fear that even a frivolous complaint will have a settlement value
out of proportion to the prospect of its success at trial;64 and (2) fear
that the proof will be too dependent on oral testimony which could be
greatly abused. 65
With regard to the first ground, the Court was particularly concerned
that "the very pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal
business activity," 66 and that there is greater potential for "abuse of the
liberal discovery provisions" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
than in other types of cases. 67 The majority found that the 1934
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 737.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 738-39 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 743.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 741.
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amendment of section 11 of the 1933 Act68 to permit recovery of costs
and attorneys' fees in the case of nuisance or "strike" suits demonstrated

congressional support for this line of reasoning.

9

Since Congress itself

feared the abuse of this type of litigation, the Court believed "that fact

alone" 70 justified it in extending this protection against abuse through
limitation of the plaintiff class. Unfortunately, the Court, in so doing,
neglected to consider the logical alternative of adhering to &healready

defined congressional scheme of section 11 penalties. 71

By merely

extending these penalties to 10b-5 actions, the Court could have guard-

ed against nuisance suits and at the same time could have achieved the
more equitable result of penalizing frivolous plaintiffs, rather than following the chosen course of protecting clever defendants.7 2

The Court was also concerned with the evidentiary problems arising
from the proof of a rule 1 Ob-5 violation when it stated that even though
[t]he Birnbaum rule undoubtedly excludes plaintiffs who have in fact

been damaged by violations of Rule 10b-5 . . .it also separates in a
readily demonstrable manner the group of plaintiffs who actually purchased or actually sold, and whose version of the facts is therefore more
likely to be believed by the trier of fact, from the vastly larger world of
potential plaintiffs who might successfully allege a claim but could sel73
dom succeed in proving it.

68. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
69. 421 U.S. at 740-41.
70. Id. at 741.
71. Section 11 provides in part:
In any suit under this or any other section of this subehapter the court may, in
its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, including reasonable attorney's fees, and if judgment shall be rendered against a party
litigant.

. .

such costs may be assessed in favor of [the prevailing] party . . . if

the court believes the suit or the defense to have been without merit, in an amount
sufficient to reimburse [the prevailing party] for the reasonable expenses incurred
by him, in connection with such suit ....
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1970).
72. Since, as the Court has argued, private actions under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
are judicially created rights, it would not appear unreasonable for the Court to take such
a step. In addition to the section 11 penalties, which apply to the entire domestic
securities section of the 1933 Act, identical penalties are found in sections 9 and 18 of
the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (1970). There is also some legal precedence for
such a decision. In Dabney v. Alleghany Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), an
action brought in part under the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, the
Court applied the section 11 cost provisions to the first and third counts of the complaint
which were brought under the 1933 Act. Id. at 32-33. The practical effect of this action was to make these penalties applicable to section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, on which
the first count also relied.
73. 421 U.S. at 743.
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Thus, the Court was particularly concerned that proof of the necessary
facts, including the actual effect upon plaintiffs of the defendant's misrepresentations, would probably depend "almost entirely upon oral testimony," 74 which would be largely uncorroborated by any demonstrable
facts. It would often be impossible for the defendant to disprove the
plaintiff's highly subjective version of the facts, or to offer any contradictory evidence at all."h Thus the jury would reach a verdict based
solely on its opinion of the plaintiff's credibility, rather than on a careful
weighing of the evidence.
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, was highly critical of this approach:
[Tihe Court, in my view, unfortunately mires itself in speculation
and conjecture not usually seen in its opinions. In order to support an
interpretation that obviously narrows a provision of the securities laws
designed to be a "catch-all," .the Court takes alarm at the "practical difficulties".., that would follow the removal of Birnbaum's barrier. 70
The Justice then summarized the majority's list of "dangerous vexations" and cryptically noted that the majority acted "as if all these were
' ' 77
unknown to lawsuits taking place in America's courthouses everyday.
The dissent expressed a fear that the majority was essentially substituting expedience for justice. Since the Court, by predetermining which
plaintiffs may and may not meet their burden of proof, created an
artificial test which prevents those injured by novel forms of manipulation from recovering, Justice Blackmun stated he would follow the
precedent set by Eason7 1 and allow sensible standards of proof and of
demonstrable damages to evolve to protect against frivolous law suits.

Til. EFFECTS OF BLUE CHIP'S ADOPTION OF

THE

BIRNBAUM RULE

Although the Blue Chip- opinion resolved with finality the disputes
over the validity of the Birnbaum rule, and severely limited the courts'
abilities to creatively extend the definitions of purchasers and sellers
under this doctrine by .expressly granting standing only to those plaintiffs who had actually purchased or sold, there are other problem areas
which have been left undecided. These include derivative actions, the
"frustrated seller" cases, the requirement of standing in injunctive relief
actions, and the potential use of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 746.
Id. at 769-70.
Id. at 769.
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
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A.

Derivative Actions

With regard to derivative actions the Court noted that certain groups
of shareholders (specifically, those who decide not to sell their stock
because of misrepresentations, and those whose stock declines in value
because of corporate or insider activities which violate rule lOb-5) are
"frequently . . . able to circumvent the Birnbaum limitation by bringing a derivative action on behalf of the corporate issuer if the latter is
itself a purchaser or seller of securities."7
The Court's noncommittal comment on this aspect of -the Birnbaum
rule indicates that it niay be leaving an open window through which
these particular plaintiffs can find a remedy so long as the corporation
itself has standing -o assert a cause of action. The advantages of this
procedure are limited, however, because the plaintiffs in a derivative
action normally gain no individual benefit other than the increase in the
value of their stock which may result from any recovery they procure
for the corporation."0 The circuit courts have generally allowed these
suits to proceed under lOb-5, even when the "deception occurred as
part of a larger scheme of corporate mismanagement ... "s'
Walner v. Friedman,"2 a recent case dismissing a derivative action,
interpreted the Blue Chip comment on derivative actions as "suggest[ing]
that where . . . a corporation is neither a purchaser nor a seller of
securities, a plaintiff who sues derivatively states no claim under Rule
lOb-5. ''8 3 This indicates that courts will strictly apply the BirnbaumBlue Chip doctrine to derivative actions as well as individual suits.
B.

"FrustratedSellers"

"Frustrated seller" cases are closely akin to the derivative action.
Stockwell v. Reynolds Co.,8 4 which is often cited for its liberal construction of the words "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," involved this type of action. It held that a plaintiff who had been
79. 421 U.S. at 738.
80. But see Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); Note, Individual Pro Rata Recovery in Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 69 HtARv.
L. R V.1314 (1956). Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees if they prevail, as in other
derivative suits.
81. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 880 (5th Cir. 1970). See also Pappas v. Moss,
393 F.2d 865, 869 (3d Cir. 1968); O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1964);
Hooper v. Mountain States Securities Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960).
82. CCH Fun. SEc. L. REP. f 95,318 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1975).
83. Id. at I 98,612.
84. 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
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fraudulently induced to defer the sale of his stock, and then after dis-

covering the fraud sold his stock at a greater loss, may recover by showing that his loss was result of the defendant's fraud.85 However Stockwell is not without limits. It has been distinguished on the grounds that

it involved a "calculated and deliberate effort to induce the plaintiff,
by express affirmative fraudulent misrepresentations, to retain his
stock." 6 Also, fraud must be directly connected with the purchase or
sale of securities by the plaintiff; thus a decline in stock value is not

actionable unless accompanied by a sale. 7
Madison Fund, Inc. v. The Charter Co.88 briefly discussed the effect
of Blue Chip on Stockwell. The defendants argued that Blue Chip
impliedly establishes that any plaintiff who claims a loss resulting from
his retention of stock is per se beyond the pale of the Birnbaum rulewhether or not that stock was ultimately sold.89
The plaintiffs contended that:
Stockwell stands unshaken in the wake of Blue Chip Stamps' broad pronouncement that the Birnbaum rule "limits the class of plaintiffs to
those who have at least dealt in the security to which the. . . representation. . . relates." 9 0
85. Id. at 219.

In Stockwell, plaintiffs purchased stock in Alside, Inc. from a

brokerage firm after being advised that a partner in the firm was also a director of
"Alside. Subsequently the plaintiffs decided to sell because of the stock's declining
market value. They were dissuaded from doing this by the broker's fraudulent representations concerning Alside's financial position. They eventually sold at a greater loss
than would otherwise have been realized by them. See also Travis v. Anthes Imperial
Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
86. Edelman v. Decker, 337 F. Supp. 582, 585-86 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
87. Id. at 585-87. But see Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634 (2d Cir.
1967), in which the court discussed the "forced seller" problem. Plaintiff's corporation
had been merged, and he had no option other than to sell his stock to defendant.
Plaintiff chose not to sell, and instead brought a 10b-5 action alleging fraud. The court
noted:
It is true that appellant still has his stock; if he turned it in for the price of $3.29
a share, it would be clearer that appellant is a seller. Assuming that this would
not otherwise affect his right to sue under the Act and the Rule, requiring him
to do so as a condition to suit seems a needless formality.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Dudley v. Southeastern Factor & Fin. Corp., 446 F.2d
303 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom, McDaniel v. Dudley, 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Coffee
v. Permian Corp., 434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970); Crane Company v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Voege v.
American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 421 F. Supp. 369 (D. Del. 1965).
It will be
interesting to watch the effect of Blue Chip's requirement of a "demonstrable fact" on
future cases involving forced sellers.
88. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 95,295 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 1975).
89. Id. at 198,513.
90. Id., citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 747 (1975).
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It appears that the plaintiff's contentions in Madison as to the current
viability of the basic premises of Stockwell are correct. This conclusion
finds support in the Blue Chip opinion itself. The Court noted that one
of the classes of plaintiffs barred by the Birnbaum rule is that of "actual
shareholders . . . who allege that they decided not to sell their shares
because of an unduly rosy misrepresentation or a failure to disclose
. . -1" At first glance this appears to overrule Stockwell. However,
other language in the Court's opinion strongly indicates that an eventual
sale of the stock is sufficient to bring frustrated sellers within the
Birnbaum rule. For example, the Court cited to its opinion in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States92 and stated that:
While the damages suffered by purchasers and sellers pursuing a § 10(b)
cause of action may on occasion be difficult -to ascertain . . . in the
main such purchasers and sellers at least seek to base recovery on a
demonstrable number of shares traded. 93
The emphasis in Blue Chip seems to be on providing an "objectively
demonstrable fact" in an area otherwise open to speculation and conjecture. 94 A purchase or sale satisfies this requirement; however, the
Court did not discuss any specific guidelines as to the necessary proximity in time between the fraud and the stock transaction. This leaves the
lower courts free to formulate their own opinions in light of the general
policy enunciated in Blue Chip. 5
C.

Injunctive Relief Actions

Another area mentioned in passing by the Blue Chip Court as a basis
for a flexible interpretation of the Birnbaum rule is the action for
injunctive relief. The Court noted that its decision in SEC v. National
Securities, Inc.,96 "established that the purchaser-seller rule imposes no
limitation on the standing of the SEC to bring actions for injunctive
relief under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. ' 97 This remedy was extended to
The court ultimately avoided deciding the issue by finding that plaintiff had had no
intent to sell: "Moreover, where a 'frustrated seller' claim is made under Rule lOb-5, a
clear indication of an alleged initial intention to sell is critical." Id. at 98,514.
91. 421 U.S. at 737-38.
92. 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972). See note 13 supra.
93. 421 U.S. at 734.
94. Id. at 735, 747.
95. I.e., that corporations must be protected from fraudulent and irresponsible law
suits.
96. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
97. 421 U.S. at 751 n.14.
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private suits in Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 8 and has become
the only legitimate means of allowing nonpurchasers and nonsellers to
sue for relief."' The rationale behind this was stated in Genesco:
the claim for damages . . . founders both on proof of loss and . . .
causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; on the other
hand, the claim for injunctive relief largely avoids these issues, may cure
harm suffered by continuing shareholders, and would afford complete
relief against the Rule 10b-5 violation.' 00
The courts thus have generally restricted equitable relief under the Act
to the injunction. However, Justice Goldberg's comments in SEC v.
Capital Gains Bureau,101 a suit brought under the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, indicates that this exception to Birnbaum might not be limited to injunctions. He stated: "It is not necessary in a suit for equitable
or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for
monetary damages."' 02 This comment tends to open the door for suits
based on other forms of equitable relief, such as rescission and restitution. Adopting similar reasoning, several courts have allowed nontraders to sue for equitable relief. 0 3
However, Vincent v. Moench, which stated that a showing of "causal
connection between the fraudulent sale of a security and [an] injury"
was sufficient to sustain federal jurisdiction in a suit for equitable
relief,'" placed a great deal of emphasis on its reading of Bankers Life,
which it found supported the "trend in federal courts away from a strict
application of the purchaser-seller rule."' 0 5 Blue Chip has since destroyed the viability of this reasoning but not necessarily the conclusion.
Federal Savings and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Fielding,10 in upholding fed98. 384 F.2d 540, 547 (2d Cir. 1967).
99. E.g., Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973); GAF Corp. v.
Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 721 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Kahan v.
Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 170-71, 173, (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Glen Alden
Corp. v. Kahan, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
100. 384 F.2d at 547.
101. 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963).
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Vincent v. Moench, 473 F.2d 430, 434 (10th Cir. 1973); Young v. Seaboard
Corp., 360 F. Supp. 490, 492 (D. Utah 1973); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Fielding, 309 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (D. Nev. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971):
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965) (which applied the theory of unjust
enrichment to require a defrauding buyer of stock in violation of rule lOb-5 to return his
profits to the seller).
104. 473 F.2d at 435.
105. Id. at 434.
106. 309 F. Supp. 1146 (D. Nev. 1969).
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eral jurisdiction despite the plaintiff's failure to either purchase or sell,
noted that, "We cannot... ignore the broad statutory grant of equitable jurisdiction to the district courts to secure compliance with the
regulations."'11 7 This court analogized the Securities Exchange Act
with the Fair Labor Standards Act and followed the precedents for
granting equitable relief under the latter, concluding -that "restitution is
a possible form of relief under the case made by the Complaint." 10 8
The future of this exception to the Birnbaum rule is unclear in light
of Blue Chip. While the equitable relief of returning an injured plaintiff to his former position is distinguishable from an action at law for
damages, Blue Chip's concern for demonstrable facts in damage actions
is easily extendable to any monetary form of equitable relief. Certainly
the same fears of strike suits, fraud, abuse of oral testimony, and
difficulty of proof would be applicable in many instances. In addition,
the Blue Chip Court specifically rejected the causation rule enunciated
by the dissent, 09 and relied on in Vincent.
D. Section 17(a)Suits
Other questions arising in Blue Chip's wake concern- the future
viability of private causes of action under section 17(a) of the 1933
Act. The Blue Chip court found this section significant, noting:
The wording of §10(b) directed at "fraud in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities stands in contrast with the parallel antifraud
provision of the 1933 Act, §17(a) ...reaching fraud "in the offer or
sale" of securities. 110

This language appears to indicate that section 17(a) may provide a
future means of avoiding the strict Birnbaum doctrine in the area of
stock offerings. However, the Court specifically refused to express an
opinion as to whether the section. "gives
rise to an implied cause of
action."'

The use of section 17(a) is not new, although it has generally been
overshadowed by the more popular 10b-5 action. In fact, most courts
have recognized that a private cause of action exists under this sec107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

309 F. Supp. at 1152.
Id. at 1152-54.
421 U.S. at 736-37 n.8.
Id. at 733-34.
Id. at n.6.
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tion. 11 2 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., ' " in discussing inter alia the
requirements of a suit brought under section 11 of the 1933 Act,1 14
noted that a section 17(a) suit could stand independently of a section
11 suit, so long as it contained adequate allegations of fraud. In making
this statement, the court appeared to be influenced by its similarity to
section 10(b). 115
On the other hand, Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon' " found that
congressional intent clearly indicated that private civil liability under
section 17(a) existed only when the provisions of section 1211 7 were
met. Under this interpretation, the 17(a) standing requirement is
stricter than that enunciated in Birnbaum.
Judge Friendly noted that section 17(a) was intended
only to afford a basis for injunctive relief and, on a proper showing, for
criminal liability, and was never believed to supplement the actions for
damages provided by §11 and §12.118
However, he went on to state that once buyers were given a private cause
of action under section 10(b) there was little reason for prohibiting such
actions under section 17, as long as fraud was alleged. Louis Loss, in
his three volume treatise, 1 9 also disapproves private actions under
17(a), finding them to be quite out of keeping with the purpose of the
1933 Act.
It is certainly not insignificant that the Blue Chip court cited to the
above sources while refusing to advance an opinion on the question they
raise. Despite numerous case decisions supporting the private cause of
action, the Court, with one exception, cited authorities which were
critical of the approach and emphasized the limits on liability established under sections 11 and 12. In light of the strict interpretation of
Birnbaum, and the Court's other efforts to limit the rapidly expanding
area of liability under the securities laws, it appears that a strict re112. Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant lob-5 Developments, 7 SEC. L. REV. 403,
414 (1975). See, e.g., Hanraty v. Ostertag, 470 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1972);
Kelman v. ,ICS, Inc., 447 F.2d 1305, 1308 (6th Cir. 1971); Dack v. Shanman, 227 F.
Supp. 26, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
113. 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
115. 188 F.2d at 787 n.2.
116. 378 F.2d 783, 790 (8th Cir. 1967).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). This section limits recovery to defrauded purchasers,
118. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (concurring
opinion), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Cf. Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188
F.2d 783, 787 n.4 (2d Cir. 1951).
119. 3 L. Loss, SECURIoI REGULATION 1785 (1961).
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examination of implied private actions under the 1933 Act may be
imminent.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The effect of the Blue Chip decision on suits brought under other
sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts may be pervasive. Certainly it
would be consistent to extend the Birnbaum rule to all such damage
actions, as the Blue Chip Court seemed particularly concerned with the
pragmatic effects of the rule as both a bar to frivolous litigation and as a
satisfactory method of predetermining which plaintiffs could meet the
burden of proving damages. In fact, the value of the rule would be
greatly dissipated if ingenious counsel were allowed to avoid it by alleging violations of other sections of the Acts. Myers v. American Leisure
Time Enterprises Inc.12 0 is a recent case which confronts this issue.
Plaintiffs asserted a cause of action under section 13(d) of the 1934
Act 121 which requires the filing of certain reports by those who acquire
directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of more than five percent
of a class of registered equitable security. Plaintiffs sought to avoid the
purchaser-seller requirement of section 18122 by claiming to have an
implied right of action under section 13(d) which did "not turn on their
status as purchasers or sellers.'1 23 The court held that:
Although there is no authority restricting standing in suits under § 13 (d)
to plaintiffs who are purchasers or sellers, such a holding would
seem to follow logically as an extension of the Supreme Court's holding in Manor Drug Stores. .... To allow suits by mere holders of securities in such cases would be to allow the plaintiffs to circumvent the
Birnbaum doctrine in many cases simply by casting their complaint to
include alleged violations of § 13(d). This of course would be contrary
24
to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Manor Drug Stores decision.'
With the now permanent entrenchment of Birnbaum in the federal
securities laws, many similar rulings may be expected.
As the concurring opinion notes, the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
written to protect investors from the puffing and overselling of the
120. CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 95,286 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 1975).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). This section provides that one who makes a false or
misleading statement in a document filed pursuant to the statute shall be liable only to
those persons who purchased or sold securities in reliance thereon.
123. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 95,286 at 98,465.
124. Id. at 98,466.
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1920's and 1930's. 1 25 Thus, the elimination of misleading overstatement of the issuer's prospects was one of the primary targets of the Acts.
The basic question becomes whether the courts should interpret these
acts as prohibitions against securities fraud in general and extend their
protections to investors in today's complex securities market, or whether
the courts should limit the scope of the acts to situations more nearly
akin to those which prompted their enactments. Already a broad spectrum of private rights has mushroomed under the federal securities
laws, 1 26 making the latter course seem somewhat impractical.
Blue Chip placed the Court in an interesting dilemma: private rights
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act had escaped irretrievably from the
limitations which Congress most likely intended to be placed on that
section. This foreclosed any opportunity to return to the apparent
intentions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Instead of allowing the effectiveness of the acts to continue to expand along with the modem
securities markets, the Court decided to draw the line and maintain its
conception of the status quo.
In Blue Chip the majority was faced with a novel divergence from the
usual pattern of securities frauds. Rather than rushing to battle against
the "varieties and complexities of fraud which are possible in the
contemporary securities markets,"'2 7 the Court chose instead to stand by
the inflexible Birnbaum doctrine. Rather than reading legislative intent
as transcending the particular frauds of the 1930's and preventing
securities frauds in general, the Court ignored the unremedied wrong
and the portmanteau nature of section 10(b) and instead offered an
open door to ingenious defrauders.
Mary M. Bennett

125. 421 U.S. at 759-60 n.4.
126. Lowenfels, Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 1l-5, 54
VA. L. REv. 268, 275 (1968).

127. Id. at 276.

